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Introduction
In the literature on cyberwar, one finds titles like “Cyber War Will 
Take Place!”1 or “The Myth of Cyberwar.”2 They are exemplars of a 
heated debate about a new battlefield enabled by information and 
communication technology (ICT). This debate is controversial and 
authors regularly note a lack of precision in key terminology.3 In 
addition, it involves powerful stakeholders and substantial finan-
cial interests from state actors like the military or companies active in 
ICT.4 The key observation is, however, that the debate on cyberwar 
is pushed by the transformational forces of the digitalization of soci-
ety, creating both new opportunities and vulnerabilities.5 The notion 
13
Is Cyberpeace Possible?
Markus Christen and Endre Bangerter
© The Author(s) 2017 
F. Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict,  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57123-2_13
243
M. Christen (*) 
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christen@ethik.uzh.ch
E. Bangerter 
Bern University of Applied Sciences, Biel, Switzerland
e-mail: endre.bangerter@jdiv.org
244     M. Christen and E. Bangerter
of “cyberwar” often serves as an umbrella term for almost all wrong-
ful acts in cyberspace including cybervandalism, cybercrime, espionage 
through hacking, or cyberterrorism.6 It even involves the narrative of 
mass destruction—an “Electronic Pearl Harbor” so to speak, a deadly 
strike against vital infrastructures of modern countries. Such a narra-
tive framework can be used to justify extreme regulatory measures that 
diminish privacy and other liberties, or justify major defense contracts 
for the private computer security sector.7
Given these observations, the cyberwar discussion cannot be 
 decoupled from the dependence of modern societies on information 
technology, where processing of information and even decision-making 
to some degree is increasingly outsourced to digital technology. Nobody 
denies that almost every economic sector has been deeply transformed 
through the use of computers, the Internet, digital sensor technology 
and robotic applications. Those changes will affect all social spheres of 
human life to some degree—meaning that ICT involves a momentum 
of transgression, creates new asymmetries and supports (geographic) 
unboundedness.
The transgressive momentum results from the fact that digitalizing 
information processing in all spheres of life compromises or relativizes 
the boundaries of social spheres (family and friendship, work, politics, 
education, commercial activity and production, health care, scientific 
research, etc.) around which human beings organize their social, institu-
tional, legal and moral world. Due to the enhanced reproducibility and 
transmissibility of data, the traditional separation of those social spheres, 
each governed by context-relative norms, policies and rules, are threat-
ened when social networks become banks, friends become marketers, 
or shopkeepers become intelligence officers. This is problematic, as the 
human environment is structured in social spheres that provide impor-
tant reference points for human beings. They expect to be treated differ-
ently in a family context compared to, for example, in a governmental 
organization. They accept inequality in treatment in the economic 
sphere that they would not accept in the health or legal sphere. The 
interpretation of moral values such as justice or autonomy, and the rules 
related to these values, differ along these social spheres. For example, if 
a person discloses personal information in the health sphere for research 
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purposes, the moral foundation of this choice is to help other people. 
But if this information is used in a different sphere such as the economic 
sphere, to tailor offer conditions or to maximize profit of an insurance 
company, the original intention to disclose this information and thus its 
contextual integrity is violated.8 In addition, digitalization in particu-
lar in the economic sector often involves asymmetry in the sense that 
large differences in economic and technological power of the involved 
players exist—nevertheless, also small players are able to tackle the com-
petition against large players (for example, the erosion of the music 
industry starting with file-share services like Napster). Finally, digitaliza-
tion allows for actions unconstrained by geographical borders, which is 
exemplified by cross-border activities of hacker groups like Anonymous.
What we consider interesting in that respect is the observation that 
war has similar effects on affected societies with respect to its transgres-
sive nature, asymmetry and unboundedness: First, war affects all social 
spheres to some degree and involves the potential to overrule the con-
textualized moral foundation of a social sphere (e.g., shift towards a 
state-directed economy to allocate resources). Second, modern wars 
are often asymmetric, i.e., there are significant differences with respect 
to technological and financial means between the combatant parties. 
Nevertheless, also a combatant with limited resources is able to resist a 
powerful force to a substantial degree. Finally, military conflicts can take 
place in a large and highly diverse array of places.9 Thus, the disruptive 
effects of war appear not only in the vicinity of what, conventionally, 
one would conceive of as likely battle lines.
The way some authors describe cyberwar is in line with these chang-
ing notions of war, as we will outline in Sect. “Rise of the Cyberwar 
Discussion”. We therefore suggest that cyberwar not only is enabled 
through increasing digitalization, but also stands—at least for some 
exponents in the cyberwar debate—exemplary for an understand-
ing of war that shares some features of the effect of digitalization on 
the society as a whole. In what follows, we want to argue against the 
idea that cyberwar engenders radical changes, which concern the very 
way in which we understand war. Rather, we suggest that the notion of 
cyberwar involves a definitional vagueness that is hard to avoid and—
at the same time—increases the risk of framing all malicious activity 
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in cyberspace as potentially war-related. To countervail this tendency, 
we propose increasing the level of cybersecurity in all domains of the 
digital society that involve certain structural features, such as decreasing 
complexity and counteracting (to some degree) interoperability of sys-
tems. These structural features align with some core demands of those 
advocating for cyberpeace.
Our chapter is structured as follows: In Sect. “The Insecure Design 
of Cyberspace”, we first outline the insecure design of cyberspace and 
digital technology as a starting point of our inquiry. In Sect. “Rise of 
the Cyberwar Discussion”, we provide a general description on what 
people consider examples of cyberwar. In Sect. “Problems of Defining 
Cyberwar”, we outline terminological problems associated with the cur-
rent definition of cyberwar. In Sect. “Cyberpeace as a System Property”, 
we argue that the definitional vagueness of the notion of cyberwar is 
hard to avoid and that a shift of the focus on a minimal level of cyber-
security is required—a standpoint that has been emphasized by those 
promoting cyberpeace, which includes the principle of prioritizing com-
prehensive self-defense over offense. 
The Insecure Design of Cyberspace
We begin our contribution with a review of the technological aspects 
underlying the cyberwar discussion. We first discuss the fundamental 
problems that are widely used for explaining why it is seemingly hard to 
defend IT systems. The following four points are of particular importance:
• Asymmetry between defense and offense: The argument is that IT 
administrators need to be able to defend every single device (e.g., 
server, end-user laptop, router, printer, etc.) in their network, whereas 
it is sufficient for the attacker to subvert a single system to access and 
subvert the network. This is an interesting reversal compared to con-
ventional warfare, where the attacker usually was disadvantaged when 
striking against fortified defense lines. Additionally, to this asymme-
try in the technical domain, there is an asymmetry favoring attackers 
in the human domain as well. The observation here is that relatively 
13 Is Cyberpeace Possible?     247
few skilled attackers are sufficient to carry out an intrusion, whereas 
it requires far more skilled defenders to protect the networks of the 
abundant companies and organizations that are potential targets. 
There are simply not enough security specialists to secure the current 
IT infrastructures. This is especially a problem for small and middle-
sized enterprises for which it is hard to attract specialists and/or who 
cannot afford appropriate cybersecurity.
• Complexity of ICT systems: Current ICT infrastructures are typically 
built upon numerous hardware and software components, which are 
in turn connected by various protocols. In fact, typically layers upon 
layers of software components are deployed on current infrastruc-
tures. As a result, it is impossible to deeply understand our current—
possibly overly complex—ICT infrastructure. The cybersecurity 
community unanimously believes that one needs to deeply under-
stand a system to effectively defend it; as a consequence, complex IT 
infrastructures are very hard to defend.
• Software is inherently insecure today: Software is known to contain 
programming errors (so-called bugs). Some of these bugs are security 
relevant. These are so-called software vulnerabilities. A software vul-
nerability, for instance in a PDF reader, allows an attacker to execute 
malicious code on the victim’s machine by letting the victim open an 
accordingly fabricated PDF document containing a so-called exploit 
for the corresponding vulnerability. Software exploits play an impor-
tant role in the initial compromise of a victim’s machine in many 
attacks. One does not know how to write bug- and vulnerability free, 
and thus secure, software today.
• Lack of attribution and consequences for the attacker: The goal of attri-
bution is to identify the attacker (group or individual) responsible 
for an attack. Identification can have various meanings, e.g., iden-
tification of an individual hacker for the purpose of legal prosecu-
tion, or the association of a state-level attacker with a country. If the 
attacker is careful, attribution is difficult and time consuming, and 
sometimes impossible. As a consequence, hacktivists, cybercriminals 
and similar actors only face a low risk to be apprehended and prose-
cuted, and deterrence against cyberattacks is low. Moreover, it makes 
it difficult to differentiate between state and non-state attackers. 
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Therefore, the distinction between state and non-state-level attack-
ers is often made based on the sophistication of an attack. This 
can, however, be a fallacy, since if a victim’s security stance is weak, 
state-level attackers will not have to resort to sophisticated attack 
techniques, but rather commonly used techniques that are equally 
accessible to non-state actors.
It is unlikely that any of these problems will be fundamentally and 
thoroughly solved in the near future. Even worse, emerging technical 
trends such as the Internet of Things10 will make security problems even 
worse, since they further increase the aspects of asymmetry and com-
plexity mentioned previously. In a nutshell, all these observations seem 
thus to suggest that ICT systems are inherently insecure and that the 
current state of having abundant attacks and breaches is a direct conse-
quence of this inherent insecurity.
While the core problems sketched here are rarely disputed, there is 
criticism concerning the somewhat fatalist conclusions being drawn 
from these problems as well as on the overall assessment of the grav-
ity of the problem. Bejitlich,11 for instance, points out that there are 
several myths surrounding the nature of cyberattacks. One is that 
cyberattacks are “fast,” that is, once the attacker manages to breach the 
network he or she will quickly carry out the core actions of the attack, 
such as information exfiltration, etc. The other is that “defense is domi-
nated by the offense” and that thus defense is a hopeless endeavor 
(this corresponds to apparent advantages of an attacker based on the 
asymmetric relation between attack and defense, as discussed earlier). 
Bejitlich argues that neither is true. In fact, advanced attackers typically 
operate slowly over periods of weeks or months. This allows them to 
avoid triggering obvious intrusion alarms by being too noisy, on the 
one hand, and to carefully explore the victim’s network, on the other. 
He also points out that defense is not hopeless. He cites the attack on 
the New York Times,12 whose network was successfully infiltrated by 
allegedly Chinese attackers who, however, did not manage to get hold 
of truly critical data. This example illustrates that breaches are not just 
black or white and that one may experience a loss of security in parts 
of the network where relatively insensitive data is processed, whereas 
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critical data can be protected. This observation is in line with best 
practices, which suggest to compartmentalize networks and data cor-
responding to their importance. It seems to be the case, however, that 
many companies and organizations do not yet follow such and other 
best practices (e.g., security monitoring).13
Anderson et al. (2013) state in their study on the costs of cybercrime 
that the problem of cybercrime attacks is overstated, typically by agents 
such as vendors and governmental security organizations whose revenue 
or even justification of existence is based on overestimating the size of 
the problem—a similar observation to that made by critics of the cur-
rent cyberwar discussion.
In summary, we believe that getting cybersecurity right is a diffi-
cult problem and that there are indeed substantial attacks happening. 
However, it seems that many victims have not yet reached the state of 
the art in securing their networks, which in turn facilitates attacks by 
non-state-level and state-level actors alike. It is clear that attacks by suf-
ficiently skilled and funded actors are under such circumstances very 
likely to succeed.
Rise of the Cyberwar Discussion
The insecure design of the current ICT infrastructure outlined in the 
previous section provides the basis of the contemporary cyberwar 
debate. Although there is no agreement among experts as to which 
types of cyber incidents count as examples of “cyberwar,” some events 
triggered the debate to a substantial degree—in particular a concen-
tration of events around the years 2007 to 2009. Those include the 
intrusion into government networks of England, France and Germany 
(allegedly by the People’s Republic of China), an Israeli airstrike against 
a nuclear reactor in Syria that presumably followed a hack into the 
air defense system of Syria, or coordinated attacks against the South 
Korean and US governments and business websites by unknown 
attackers (North Korea has been suspected).14
Of particular relevance for the rise of the cyberwar discussion, 
however, were the following three events. In April and May 2007, 
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Estonia—a country that pushed digitalization to a large extent—suf-
fered from a series of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks first 
against government agencies, and then against private sites and servers 
in the aftermath of the removal of a communist monument from a park 
in Tallinn. Those attacks succeeded in forcing the government and the 
largest banks offline for brief periods.15
One year later, cyberattacks occurred in Georgia directly coordi-
nated with a physical land, sea and air attack from Russian forces that 
were supporting separatists in South Ossetia—an autonomous region 
of Georgia that strived for independence since 1990. Again, DDoS 
as well as other means were used against government websites, finan-
cial and educational institutions, business associations and news media 
websites including the BBC and CNN—a preparatory cyberattack that 
may have aided the success of the conventional intervention and occu-
pation.16 It’s important to note that in neither of these cases (Estonia 
and Georgia) did the cyber strategy address, alter or otherwise remedy 
or resolve the underlying political conflict.17
Finally, starting in 2009, Stuxnet, a cyber-worm, caused damage to 
centrifuges of Iran’s nuclear reactors. The damage was done exclusively 
to a cascade of centrifuges, illegally obtained and operated in a highly 
protected site at Natanz, Iran, in explicit violation of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. Stuxnet—later unofficially disclosed as an US and 
Israeli operation—was considered to be an example of an “ethical” 
cyberweapon18 because its creators had taken pains in designing it to 
target only Iranian nuclear processing facilities; yet it had spread far 
beyond intended targets. Although its damage was highly constrained, 
Stuxnet’s quick broad infection was noticed and required upgrades to 
antivirus software worldwide, incurring a cost to everyone. The worm 
also provided excellent ideas for new exploits that are already being 
used, another cost to everyone19—all this shows that even careful design 
to contain the effect of a cyberweapon leads to collateral damage due to 
the highly interconnected nature of the ICT infrastructure.
Through these examples, cyberwar has been elevated by some authors 
from a barely mentioned security concern to one of the greatest mili-
tary dangers in just a few short years. The cyberattacks in, for example, 
Estonia were certainly not the first of their kind,20 and their effects on 
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Estonia’s critical information infrastructure were neither serious nor long 
lasting. Yet the 2007 events in Tallinn “fired the imagination,” culminat-
ing in opening the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in 
Tallinn on 14 May 2008.21 This Center of Excellence also was responsible 
for creating the “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare,” written at the invitation of the Centre by an independent 
international group of experts. This 3-year effort aimed to examine how 
extant international legal norms apply to cyberwarfare.
A quantitative look on the literature supports this observation. 
Generally, the number of academic papers employing cyberwar termi-
nology steadily increased since the late 1990s (relative to all academic 
papers on cyber topics), whereas in the lay literature a sudden and sub-
stantial increase can be observed right after 2007 (Fig. 13.1, see figure 
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Fig. 13.1 Fraction of “cyberwar publications” compared to all publications 
containing the terminology of “cyber” in their title or abstract. The search was 
performed on April 21 2016 in the database Web of Science (See https://apps.
webofknowledge.com) (scientific literature) and Factiva (See https://global.
factiva.com) (various types of publications in general media including business 
sources). The Boolean search expression for “cyberwar papers” was “cyberwar 
OR (cyber* AND warfare) OR (cyber* AND conflict),” the expression for publica-
tions on cyber topics was “cyber*”. The time span was 1991 to 2015; we display 
the relative fraction of cyberwar publications in each database per year
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legend for methodological details). This shows that particularly in the 
popular domain, the events of 2007 to 2009 triggered an intensified 
interest in cyberwar. For the scientific domain, the steady increase in 
interest can be traced back to a fundamental reconceptualization in vari-
ous national security circles around 2000 that digital technology, par-
ticularly within the cyber domain, has serious military implications. 
Thus, cyberspace was conceptualized as an actual environment; an 
example of this in the United States is the setup of the Cyber Command, 
which unifies all of the existing military cyber activities under a single 
command.22
Problems of Defining Cyberwar
The increasing interest in cyberwar in academic and popular domains 
does not go along with an increased clarity regarding the definition of 
the term or with an agreement about which malicious acts in cyberspace 
should be considered acts of war. Rather, the discussion can be struc-
tured along two poles that reflect how the degree of impact and disrup-
tiveness of digitalization is understood.
The representatives of one pole23 are deeply skeptical towards the 
proposal that cyberwar is a completely new and independent phenom-
enon and that it should be understood as war in the traditional sense. 
Thomas Rid (2013) holds this view. He refers to the definition of war 
by Carl von Clausewitz according to which aggressive or defensive 
action must meet three criteria in order to qualify as an act of war. First, 
acts of war are violent. Second, an act of war is instrumental: physi-
cal violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to 
accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack 
must have some kind of political goal or intention. Referring to past 
cases, Rid argues that, so far, a human being has not been injured or 
hurt as an immediate consequence of a cyberattack and a state never 
did coerce another state by a cyberattack, which would require disclos-
ing the attacker’s identity. But in the contrary, state-sponsored offenders 
usually don’t even take credit for an attack, which makes it difficult to 
use anonymous attacks for pursuing the political goals of an aggressor.24
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Gartzke (2013) criticizes that the cyberwar discussion almost exclu-
sively focuses on the potential of harm a cyberattack may pose, but the 
motives and operational logic of perpetrators is not often explored. 
Specific features of cyberattacks—in particular anonymity, which has 
been considered to be the most important, and potentially menacing, 
characteristics of cyberwar25—fail to be aligned with strategic goals of 
war. Although the advantage of anonymity will persist for peripheral 
forms of warfare on the internet (e.g., for espionage and sabotage), most 
forms of political conflict encourage disclosing an initiator’s identity. 
On the political level, coercion usually requires attribution—other-
wise the “winner” in the conflict is unable to justify the use of resources 
needed for coercing and he cannot claim the success for his operations.
Even in asymmetric wars that include terrorist acts against civil 
populations, the direct effects of cyberattacks are likely to be limited. 
According to Gartzke (2013), it is difficult to see how internet attacks 
will be able to instill the quality of fear needed to magnify the actions 
of insurgents. Although no one would be happy when the power goes 
out or when one’s bank account is locked down, attacks of this type 
cause anger, frustration, even resignation; but not terror as in the case 
of attacking people with suicide bombers or assault rifles. Furthermore, 
using cyberweapons requires a certain amount of sophistication, but 
they are nevertheless deployable usually only for one-off, hard-to-
repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might 
even prove counterproductive.26 Taken together, these factors call into 
question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will lead to a pro-
foundly new era and “cyberwar” is just a metaphor—analogous to the 
“war on drugs.”
Empirical evidence supports such a critical view on cyberwar. 
Valeriano and Maness (2014) have collected information on cyber 
incidents (individual operations launched against a state) and cyber 
disputes (specific campaigns between two states using cyber tactics 
during a particular time period that can contain one to several inci-
dents) between rival states in the last decade in order to delineate 
the patterns of cyber conflict as reflected by evidence on the interna-
tional level. They found that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber 
disputes among rivals does not match with popular perception: only 
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20 of 126 active rivals engaged in activities that can be called cyber 
conflicts, which the authors define as the use of computational tech-
nologies in cyberspace for malevolent and destructive purposes in 
order to impact, change, or modify diplomatic and military interac-
tions between entities short of war and away from the battlefield. The 
authors also found that the interactions that were uncovered are lim-
ited in terms of magnitude and frequency. Further, most of the cyber 
disputes that are uncovered are regional in tone.
Representatives of the other pole of the debate27 has a radically dif-
ferent view on cyberwar. They consider cyberwar a phenomenon that 
reshapes the concept of war itself.28 Those representatives consider 
cyberwar to be an inevitable consequence of digitalization. ICT enables 
new types of weapons like drones and semi-autonomous robots used 
to hit ground targets, defuse bombs, and conduct patrolling actions, 
and ICT creates a new battlefield, the cyber domain. The most strik-
ing characteristics of this pole of the debate is that its representatives 
claim that cyberwar leads to a blurring of the distinction between mili-
tary and civil society because virtually everybody could become a tar-
get.29 Given that the critical infrastructure of a country increasingly 
relies on computer control systems that regulate the operations of the 
infrastructure—e.g., by managing the flow of natural gas through a 
pipeline, or the production of chemicals—and taking into account that 
these systems are increasingly connected to other networks, including 
the Internet, the current mode of organizing society and its economy 
becomes vulnerable.30 Along this line, representatives of this pole con-
sider the definitions of war of Rid and others to be too restrictive. They 
claim that acts of war do not require the use of lethal force and there-
fore the status of cyberattacks should not be judged on this basis.
The representatives of this pole also take the fact that armed forces 
increasingly rely on information technology more seriously compared to 
the representatives of the other pole. The latter certainly admit that the 
increasing dependence of the military on new technology render them 
more vulnerable and prone to incidences of potentially crippling cyber-
attacks. But those who consider cyberwar to redefine how war is waged 
go beyond that point. They claim, that as digitalization itself is blur-
ring many conceptual boundaries in the real world (see Introduction), 
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cyberwar exemplifies the blurring of the notion of war: civilians can 
launch cyberattacks that target both military and civilian infrastruc-
tures, cybercriminals can become cyber mercenaries, and the assessment 
of responsibilities when using semi-autonomous robotic weapons and 
malware becomes difficult.31 In summary, representatives of this pole 
stand for a definitional vagueness of cyberwar, reflecting that war itself 
has become more difficult to define.
However, for the military practice (and surely also of the theory of 
cyberwar), such a “definitional openness” of the notion of cyberwar is 
problematic, as practical issues like adapting the law of armed conflicts 
to this “fifth domain of war”32, 33 require a more precise definition. It 
is thus not surprising that the Tallinn Manual34 defines a cyberattack 
rather conservatively, namely as a cyber-operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to per-
sons or damage or destruction to objects. Excluded from this definition 
are psychological cyber-operations (e.g., blackmailing enemy command-
ers or undermining their reputation) or cyberespionage. Along these 
lines, Liff (2012) defines cyberwar as operations that are restricted to 
computer network operations whose means (not necessarily its indirect 
effects) are non-physical and that have direct political and/or military 
objectives—namely, attacks with coercive intent and/or as a means to 
some strategic and/or brute force end—and computer network defense.
Other authors opt for a broader definition of cyberwar. Lewis (2011), 
for example, defines cyberwar as the use of cyber techniques to cause 
damage, destruction, or casualties for political effects by states or politi-
cal groups. If a cyberwar is defined in such a way, understanding the 
role of cyberweapons requires asking the same questions as for any 
other weapons system: what are the range, destructiveness, cost, effect, 
and political implications of its use? Given what has been witnessed, 
cyberattacks’ physical consequences resemble more those of sabotage 
acts than those of a strategic weapon or an attack by ground forces. 
Furthermore, cyberattacks introduce a new dimension in the ability to 
cause uncertainty, e.g., by manipulating data on which the decisions of 
the opponents are based.35
The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF) adopted an even broader definition of cyberwar in its DCAF 
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Horizons 2015 Working Paper that includes cybervandalism, cyber-
crime, and cyberespionage.36 It defines cyberwar as warlike conduct 
conducted in virtual space using information, communications tech-
nology, and networks, with the intention of disruption or destruction 
of the enemy’s information and communications systems and in this 
way influencing the decision-making capacity of an opponent’s politi-
cal leadership and armed forces. This definition distinguishes between 
state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored cyberattacks—a distinction 
also emphasized by Dipert (2014), who distinguishes between the 
notion of cyberwar as conducted among nations or nation-like polit-
ical entities from the notion of a cyberattack by individuals, corpo-
rate entities, or other groups of individuals, and further distinguishes 
both from cyberespionage and from cybertheft of intellectual prop-
erty. According to Dipert, criminal cyberattacks motivated by finan-
cial gains, hacktivist cyberattacks (the subversive use of computers and 
computer networks to promote a political agenda) or mere vandal-
ism do not count as cyberwar. Regarding attacks conducted as parts 
of a cyberwar, however, there at least three kinds. First, commanded 
attacks, ordered or directed by a state’s central authority; second, tol-
erated acts, which are attacks that benefit the host state but that are 
not initiated and directed by the host state; and third, patriotic acts, 
which are attacks on behalf of a state but that are not expressly tol-
erated by the benefited state, perhaps because it does not know of 
them.37
To summarize, all these attempts to define cyberwar show the blur-
ring boundary between acts of cyberwar and other types of mali-
cious activities in cyberspace. This blurring even includes those who 
actually perform these activities. Cyberattack for hire is a lucrative 
business for those who have been previously overlooked as merely 
cybercriminals. As noted by many, including Richard Clarke, for-
mer National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Counterterrorism for the United States, cybercriminals can become 
rental cyberwarriors.38 There’s even evidence that governments are 
deliberating cultivating an ecosystem of cybercrime and privateering.39 
All this increases the risk of framing all malicious activity in cyberspace 
as potentially war-related.
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Cyberpeace as a System Property
Our review of the cybersecurity discussion in Sect. “Problems of 
Defining Cyberwar” reveals that the notion of cyberwar involves a 
definitional vagueness that is hard to avoid. The reason for that is 
that the insecure nature of cyberspace outlined in Sect. “The Insecure 
Design of Cyberspace” actually supports both poles of the cybersecu-
rity debate: Those who support the idea that cyberwar is a new, funda-
mental threat for modern societies are right when pointing to the fact 
that the digital infrastructure indeed has vulnerabilities that are hard to 
overcome—and an increasing dependence on this infrastructure poses 
new risks. However, the cyberwar sceptics are also right in observing 
that the nature of these vulnerabilities makes it unlikely that many of 
the malicious activities in cyberspace conform to warfare as an instru-
ment to reach political goals. They certainly are instruments to sup-
port espionage, propaganda and similar activities that are elements of 
war. Those are instruments where non-attribution is unproblematic 
or even required, and the advantage of anonymity will persist in some 
forms of terrestrial competition and conflict. But a cyberwar launched 
from unidentified sources fails to provide the target with the means to 
acquiesce and it is in an attacker’s interest to “brand” its actions to most 
effectively elicit concessions from a target.40 Indeed, even if demands 
are complied with, an attacker will have difficulty obtaining sustained 
compliance, given the impossibility of demonstrating future capabili-
ties. Furthermore, when attackers backed by a nation state indeed plan 
to build strategic war-force in cyberspace, they are confronted with the 
problem that their own infrastructure is, in principle, in equal danger as 
that of their opponent, because the digital infrastructure of their own 
administrations, banks, companies, hospitals, etc. is a comparably easy 
target.
Given this definitional vagueness of cyberwar and the difficulty to 
determine which malicious acts in cyberspace actually could count as 
cyberattacks that constitute a cyberwar, we suggest to change the per-
spective, namely to focus on a global culture of cybersecurity. This 
includes various elements such as the availability of warning systems, 
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built-in redundancies, but also trained behavioral modes like the explo-
ration of areas of cooperation within the stakeholder community as part 
of a peaceful environment, as well as increased information sharing.41 
Rid (2013) observed that loose talk of cyberwar tends to overhype the 
offensive potential of cyberattacks such that people who are not cyber-
security practitioners are more likely to ignore the importance (and the 
potential) of defense measures. The focus on cyberwar also entails the 
risk that those operating potential (civilian) target ICT systems (e.g., 
related to the critical infrastructure) believe that military institutions 
are in charge of dealing with the threat—but companies and individu-
als need to take responsibility for their own security. Finally, as long as 
people in organizations practice poor cybersecurity, essentially anybody 
can successfully carry out an attack; but if anybody can be an attacker, it 
is impossible to differentiate between attacks done by nation states and 
simple opportunistic attacks. Thus, a low level of cybersecurity actually 
increases the difficulty of properly defining cyberwar.
In the near term, a first step would be to consistently apply existing 
best practices such as reduction of complexity, compartmentalization, 
or improved monitoring. The first element—reduction of complex-
ity—is indeed hard to attain given that the technology industry is 
driven by the demand for features, for options, for speed. And each 
of the products produced by this industry has its own console, its own 
terminology, its own policies, and its own alerts. Thus, what is needed 
to reduce complexity are both political (such as introducing liability 
for insecure software) and practical (e.g., to reduce the diversity of 
devices used within an organization) measures. The second element 
involves counteracting interconnectivity of devices at least to some 
degree. The Director of US National Intelligence recently said dur-
ing a senate hearing on worldwide threats that interconnected devices 
could be useful “for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location 
tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks 
or user credentials.”42 In other words, interconnectedness increases the 
potential of successful cyberattacks as well as their impact (e.g., with 
respect to the amount of data that can be captured). Likely targets 
such as critical infrastructures, defense contractors, state-level organi-
zations, etc. should therefore ensure compartmentalization of their 
13 Is Cyberpeace Possible?     259
ICT infrastructure, which basically means to divide assets into smaller 
pieces and secure them separately. For example, this could require not 
to rely on a single electronic identity and to use different identification 
markers for different parts of the system. In the mid-term, investments 
into research and development of defensive technologies are needed, 
on the one hand, and into skilled cybersecurity specialists, on the 
other hand.
However, technological and operational advances are unlikely to 
entirely solve out cybersecurity problems. There are also societal and 
cultural advancements that will be needed. Interestingly, this focus 
on the various aspects that entail such a culture of security have 
been promoted in a strand of the cybersecurity debate that is often 
neglected, those who opted for the positive side in the war-peace 
antinomy, namely cyberpeace.43 The International Telecommunication 
Union proposed five principles for cyberpeace: First, every govern-
ment should commit itself to giving its people access to communica-
tions. Second, every government will commit itself to protecting its 
people in cyberspace. Third, every country will commit itself not to 
harbor terrorists/criminals in its own territories. Fourth, every coun-
try should commit itself not to be the first to launch a cyberattack on 
other countries. Fifth, every country must commit itself to collaborate 
with each other within an international framework of cooperation to 
ensure that there is peace (understood as the pursuit of possible ben-
efits and positive potential of ICT) in cyberspace.44 While these prin-
ciples are obviously rather abstract, they entail a notion of peace that 
does not only involve the absence of certain violent acts, but implies 
the prevalence of legal and general moral principles, possibilities 
and procedures for settlement of conflicts, durability and stability.45 
Before such a state of cyberpeace can be reached, however, a clear 
focus on an enhanced cybersecurity culture will be needed, which 
involves slowing down and simplifying the process of digitalization of 
all spheres of human life.
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Notes
 1. Stone (2013).
 2. Gartzke (2013).
 3. Flowers and Zeadally (2014); Lewis (2011); Lucas (2014).
 4. Rid (2013).
 5. Floridi (2016).
 6. Orend (2014).
 7. Deibert (2011).
 8. Christen, Markus; Blumer, Helene; Hauser, Christian and Huppenbauer, 
Markus. The ethics of Big Data applications in the consumer sector. In: 
Braschler, M.; Stadelmann, T.; Stockinger, K. (eds.): Applied Data Science 
- Lessons Learned for the Data-Driven Business. Submitted.
 9. Gregory (2011a, b).
 10. The Internet of Things (IoT) is loosely speaking the emerging trend 
to connect appliances and objects of everyday life (e.g., cars, kitchen 
and household appliances, watches, smart meters, etc.) to the global 
Internet. IoT dramatically increases the sheer number of networked 
devices and increases the diversity of devices, resulting in an increase of 
overall system complexity.
 11. Army Cyber Institute (2016).
 12. See Perlroth (2013).
 13. This claim is based on private communications with practitioners from 
the IT security community. However, to our knowledge there are no 
systematic studies to substantiate this claim, not least of all since many 
incidents are non-public. Yet, as an example consider the Sony hack, 
which is surrounded by many speculations about potential nation state 
actors. Public sources (Goodin 2014) point out that the security stance 
of Sony was in a bad shape.
 14. Flowers and Zeadally (2014).
 15. Kaiser (2015).
 16. Flowers and Zeadally (2014).
 17. Lucas (2014).
 18. Lucas (2014).
 19. Lin et al. (2014).
 20. Hancock (1999).
 21. Kaiser (2015).
 22. Deibert (2011).
 23. E.g. Schmitt (2002); Rid (2013).
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 24. Liff (2012).
 25. Deibert (2011).
 26. Rid (2013).
 27. E.g. Floridi and Taddeo (2014); Stone (2013).
 28. Floridi and Taddeo (2014).
 29. Taddeo (2012).
 30. Flowers and Zeadally (2014).
 31. Floridi and Taddeo (2014).
 32. On June 14 2016, the NATO state defense ministers have formally rec-
ognized cyberspace as a domain of warfare (Barnes 2016).
 33. Editorial (2014).
 34. Schmitt (2013).
 35. Lewis (2011).
 36. Schreier (2013).
 37. Dipert (2014).
 38. In Flowers and Zeadally (2014).
 39. Deibert (2011).
 40. Gartzke (2013).
 41. Wegener (2011).
 42. See Ackerman and Thielman (2016).
 43. Wegener (2011).
 44. Touré (2011).
 45. Wegener (2011).
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